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Since 1994 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been a major
player in the field of combating human trafficking worldwide. From then on the
organisation has provided approximately 15,000 instances of direct assistance to
persons affected by trafficking, and implemented around 500 counter-trafficking
projects worldwide (Prevention of Human Trafficking in the Russian Federation a).
The IOM’s power and influence are based on material as well as intersubjective
factors - namely their ability to classify the world (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The
IOM shapes perceptions and knowledge of, and political strategies for, combating
trafficking in human beings. It frequently holds sway over the definitions and
subsequent development of solutions to the problem.
To meet these demands the resources most required are knowledge and expertise. I
will scrutinize the ways the IOM exercises its power ‘to create social reality and to set
parameters [of] how to act in it’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 6). Beginning with a
specification of migration management, the organisation’s fundamental concept and
programmatic framework on which political strategies to fight irregular migration and
human trafficking are based, I will look at the IOM-led project ‘Prevention of Human
Trafficking in the Russian Federation’. I shall explore project practices that aim to
define ‘at-risk groups’ and to identify and process the so-called ‘Victim of
Trafficking’ (VoT). Studying these patterns shows how IOM creates its anti-
trafficking interventions through establishing victim identities and simultaneously
establishing understandings of appropriate anti-trafficking policies. This will allow
me also to examine what these policies mean for potential migrants and VoTs.
In conclusion, I shall confront the assumptions and classifications made by IOM
with the organisation’s commitment to manage migration comprehensively through
balancing reactive and proactive tools of migration management. I will argue that
victim ascriptions allow for restrictive and control-oriented rather than for proactive
anti-trafficking measures.
Migration Management, Trafficking and Security
IOM’s anti-trafficking-approach is intrinsically tied to the concept of migration
management. This has significant consequences for both defining the problem and for
the solutions to be implemented.
In the early 1990s various factors such as the asylum crisis in Western Europe, East-
West migration, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a growing South-North
migration (see Georgi 2007, 11; International Centre for Migration Policy
Development 2008) triggered a crisis in the Western European systems of migration
policy. In response to these ongoing changes, migration mastermind Jonas Widgren,
former director of the Vienna-based think tank International Centre for Migration
Policy Development (ICMPD) and long-standing consultant for the IOM, promoted
the development of a new concept to steer migration: migration management. At the
eleventh IOM seminar on ‘International Response to Trafficking in Migrants and
Safeguarding of Migrants Rights’ in October 1994 he called for a paradigm shift from
an international migration regime, originating from the early 1920s (Widgren 1994),
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reasonable and beneficial way. According to Widgren, a new migration world order
had to meet two policy objectives: a) ‘preventing mass movements from occurring’;
and b) ‘creation of orderly migration channels between continents and nations’
(Widgren 1994, 17).
The IOM, the ‘leading organization on migration’ (International Organization for
Migration 2003), is mandated by its 125 member states to transport migrants and to
follow elaborate guidelines to steer migration (Constitution of the International
Organization for Migration, art. 1). It strives to put Widgren’s ideas into practice. The
organisation pursues a management approach in order to regulate migration when it is
impossible to restrict it: ‘The IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and orderly
migration for the benefit of all. It does so by providing services and advice to
governments and migrants’ (International Organization for Migration 2003). Bimal
Gosh, a senior advisor at the IOM, points out that migration management addresses
migration with proactive and reactive measures (Ghosh 2003; International
Organization for Migration 2003). For example, proactive migration management
includes creating opportunities for legal migration and setting up programmes to
address the ‘root causes’ of migration. Reactive measures of migration management
include intensifying border controls and encouraging so-called voluntary return.
Migration management appears to be an alternative to more conservative restrictive
strategies by putting forward a model for ‘regulated openness’ (Ghosh 2003, 25),
seemingly including the interests of all parties involved in migration: migrants as well
as the sending and destination countries (International Organization for Migration).
Yet the model does primarily promote criteria for migration policies oriented towards
the ‘usefulness’ of migrants, i.e. the benefits they offer national economies (Düvell
2002, 159). Thus migration management doesn’t necessarily aim to increase
migration. It is rather geared to improve the allocation of workforce and assure its
quality (Düvell 2002, 159).
Foucault’s concept of governmentality is a useful tool to discover what might be
the underlying motivations of migration management. In his study on the ICMPD,
Fabian Georgi scrutinizes the political rationality1 of migration management through
the lens of ‘governmentality’ in order to break away from its supposedly ‘apolitical
and technical character’ (Georgi 2007, 62 [translation S. Sch.]) and to reveal its nature
as a technique of power and domination. The intrinsic elements that constitute its
political rationality are strategic nationalism, stability of utilisation and economic
utilitarism (Georgi 2007, 103f). Each of these elements contributes in a different way
to its rationality of control. From this point of view, migration management turns out
to be an effective tool of control that is geared against migration that takes place
autonomously, rendering all self-ordained interests of migrants ‘illegitimate’ (see
Georgi 2007, 102f).
From a migration management perspective, trafficking in migrants is seen as one of
the main threats to ‘international efforts in the direction of a new international
migration order’ (Widgren 1994, 18). The IOM considers trafficking as an extreme
form of irregular migration and a severe violation of human rights (Ducasse-Rogier
2001). Following the logic of migration management, combating trafficking can mean
facilitating legal migration so that people do not have to rely on traffickers or
1 Fabian Georgi explains political rationality as the element of mentalité in Foucault’s concept
of governmentality. In summation, political rationality is the guideline for an organisation’s
actions in calculating possible pitfalls and resistance (Georgi 2007: 62f).
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providing skills and language training. Conversely, counter-trafficking measures
could imply reactive measures against irregular migration such as the stricter handling
of visas and border crossings and applying new technologies to reduce the number of
those migrating (International Organization for Migration and the Federal Office for
Migration 2005, 42).
Though a migration management approach recognises that migration constitutes an
essential component of human trafficking and promises a more holistic approach than
prevailing ‘stop organised crime models’, it does not seem to be the panacea it
promises to be. Experts like Liz Kelly doubt that a migration management approach is
capable of combating trafficking. According to Kelly, migration management does
not target the root causes of trafficking (Kelly 2005): the social, political and
economical marginalisation of women and girls from socially devalued groups and
the social construction of these women ‘as the natural or ideal occupants of the
lowliest positions in domestic or sex work’ (Anderson and O’Connell Davidson
2003).
The IOM’s reactive measures of migration management meet the security concerns
of states and societies (International Organization for Migration and the Federal
Office for Migration 2005: 46). In particular, since 11 September, trafficking which is
deemed to be a form of irregular migration that intersects simultaneously with other
control and security issues such as prostitution, illegal work, organised crime or
terrorism is considered to be not only a menace to potential migrants, but even more a
problem which has subversive effects on societal and state security. On this highly
ideological issue, the ‘IOM’s contributions have tended to emphasise the
organisation’s public concerns with the links between migration and organised crime,
drug-running and prostitution’ (Black 2003, 43) instead of elucidating the
circumstances for various kinds of ‘irregular’ migration or flight.
Security cooperation is another general theme of the project ‘Prevention of human
trafficking in the Russian Federation’. The project is implemented as a part of the
agenda for ‘Four Common Spaces’ between the EU and Russia. As an activity of the
second space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, it comes with
mutual commitments against terrorism, so-called illegal migration, and cross-border
crime. The project is funded under the EU Programme of Technical Assistance to CIS
Countries (TACIS). It has a total budget of 4.5 million euro and is co-financed by the
governments of the US and Switzerland. Launched in April 2006, the project ran until
January 2009. Its main components include policy advice in order to ‘upgrade’ Rus-
sian legislation on trafficking, the implementation of preventive campaigns and infor-
mation services, the establishment of referral mechanisms between different actors
and assistance for victims in a rehabilitation centre in Moscow, run by the IOM.
The political rationality of migration management is the red thread, which the
organisation follows in order to steer and control migration. The IOM is combating
human trafficking against this background. But how does this conceptual framework
translate into practice? In order to study the tools and techniques the IOM uses to
define and specify the social problem of trafficking and to implement corresponding
solutions, I focus on the following activities on the project level:
· Defining of at-risk-groups
· Identifying victims of trafficking (VoTs)
· Assisting VoTs
· Teaching local actors these models of identification and assistance
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As for almost all anti-trafficking interventions, the categorizing of at-risk groups is
the basis for the Russian project (Aradau 2008). The project started with conducting a
large-scale baseline study (Office of the International Organization for Migration in
the Russian Federation 2008b), which specified the indicators and parameters of the
problem. This commissioned work, carried out by independent Russian researchers,
presents the main causes and risk factors for becoming affected by human trafficking,
and therefore assesses social and economic consequences of the phenomenon in the
Russian Federation. According to these scientific insights, individual and structural
factors account for the level of risk of being trafficked. Potential victims come from
socially vulnerable and marginal groups. They are discriminated against on the basis
of gender, ethnicity or age. Children, teenagers and young adults of both genders, in
particular from problematic families with a low level of education, are identified as
specific risk groups.
An excerpt from the study is presented on IOM-Moscow’s website, suggesting that a
crucial prerequisite for becoming a victim is the decision to migrate in order to
overcome unfortunate living conditions, or as IOM calls it, ‘to break out of the
vicious cycle of poverty’. The text further states that ‘due to the fact that the
behavioural patterns of potential victims were deformed under the degrading social
conditions they are prone to find themselves in slavery-like or exploitative situations’
(Prevention of Human Trafficking in the Russian Federation b).
Including men and boys into the circle of people at risk may be perceived as IOM’s
response to the gender blindness of previous anti-trafficking interventions. For years
women were generally conceptualised as vulnerable to trafficking, whereas men were
mostly considered as smuggled. Adding men as a higher-risk group impeded
sexualised representation strategies in IOM’s awareness-raising campaigns. In the
Russian Federation the organisation abstains from showing eroticised pictures of
naked, mistreated women as it did in previous campaigns in the Baltic States or in
Southeastern Europe. The new promotional material does not automatically equate
trafficking in women with forced prostitution. It no longer fixes stereotypes of
beautiful but naïve Eastern European women and thus prevailing gender asymmetries
and (re-)traditionalised gender orders in the public space.2 Yet the campaign’s focus
on both genders disguises the fact that it is primarily women and girls who are
trafficked for sexual and labour exploitation. It obscures the fact that ‘trafficking in
women is part of a gender specific and gender hierarchic political, economical, and
social order’ (Locher 2002, 62 [translation S. Sch.]). Correspondingly, the majority of
VoTs assisted in the TACIS-project are female (70 percent). 57 per cent of them were
trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation (Office of the International Organization
for Migration in the Russian Federation 2008a).
The decision to migrate in order to overcome unfortunate living conditions and
poverty seems to be crucial to becoming a victim. Due to the fact that the behavioural
patterns of potential migrants who come from at-risk-groups are distorted under
degrading social conditions, they are prone to find themselves in slavery-like or
exploitative situations: ‘Gradually the at-risk behaviour becomes their normal
behaviour pattern and the rational behaviour categories become distorted, which is
manifested by, so-called, ‘consent to exploitation’ or ‘voluntary slavery’. Their
2 For a comprehensive analysis of the IOM’s anti-trafficking ‘representation regime’ see
Andrijasevic 2007.
6perception of the normal social behaviour pattern expands beyond the limits
acceptable to the human rights opinion and the level of humankind development’
(Prevention of Human Trafficking in the Russian Federation b).
These suppositions present potential migrants of both genders as backward and
irrational subjects—in short as potential victims. They take risky and unreasonable
decisions because they are supposedly one-dimensionally driven by push and pull
factors. In contrast, ‘“(p)ush-pull” factoring, which sounds like something that
happens to less-than-“civilised” people, is not usually mentioned when Euramericans
are the migrants; these are more likely to be described as modern selves searching
actively for better situations in which to realise their identities’ (Agustin 2003, 3).
Altogether these assumptions about at-risk groups invoke images of the ‘Other’
(Yuval-Davis 1997) in terms of class, ethnicity and sexuality. The behavioural
patterns of at-risk groups are presented as differing from forms of ‘normal’ social
behaviour. Thus, these potential victims need to be normalised and (re-)educated as
prudent subjects (O’Malley 1996)—those who are careful and who avoid unnecessary
risks. As in many other countries before, the Russian project’s awareness-raising
campaigns and information programmes call on people to make rational choices on
the basis of the organisation’s expert knowledge. For example, in the course of the
Russian project two rock music concerts were organised. IOM-Moscow distributed
information leaflets and bandleaders urged young people ‘to make the right choices
about their future’ (International Organization for Migration Moscow 2007). To a
certain degree these fliers pointed out the structural dimensions of human trafficking.
But simultaneously, as Claudia Aradau argues, these calls for rational choices shift
migration risks from the structural to the individual level (Aradau 2008, 99).
I do not intend to question whether push-and-pull factors have real impacts on
becoming affected by trafficking, but rather to question the oversimplificating
tendencies involved in such discourse, and the predominance of the explanatory
power of push-and-pull factors. The pictures that have been drawn by the IOM and
many other anti-trafficking campaigns systematically disregard individual migration
strategies that temporarily tolerate coercive and exploitative circumstances
(Andrijasevic 2004; Sharma 2003). ‘Assumptions about “risk groups” and “risk
cultures” […] miss the details of individuals’ actual practice, their constraints,
resources, and capacity to innovate and change’ (Shore and Wright 1997, 23).
Constructing at-risk groups and potential victims demarcates visible dividing lines
within a space of what Badiou calls ‘indiscernibility of knowledge’ (Badiou quoted in
Aradau 2008, 115). These representations ignore the fact that migration strategies
may include temporarily exploitative working conditions, but turn out be successful in
the end. They ascribe to women and men an incapacitation, which provides the basis
for the IOM’s (preventive) interventions and simultaneously justifies them. Therewith
these prevention campaigns have to be considered as part of reactive measures of
migration management.
The Label VoT
Another attribution crucial for the IOM’s work is the label ‘victim of trafficking’
(VoT). Generally speaking, the category VoT tends to be a very ambiguous notion
that is accompanied by many problematic aspects. The meaning of the phrase ‘victim
of trafficking’ depends highly on who is using it. States and international
bureaucracies like the IOM apply VoT normally as ‘an administrative category
entailing state protections and obligation towards individuals’ (Anderson 2007, 6).
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housing and medical and psychological support.
Other anti-trafficking actors like NGOs consider VoT as a descriptive category,
composed of ‘certain sets of experiences’ (Anderson 2007, 6). But persons who fit
into the descriptive category might not necessarily be considered as a victim in the
administrative sense (Anderson 2007). These persons will be liable for prosecution as
‘irregular’ migrants and could be returned ‘home’ as smuggled, without states being
obliged to protect their human rights (Gallagher 2001).
Labelling persons as ‘victims of trafficking’ often tends to reduce complex real-life
situations and at the same time to essentialise a broad spectre of distinct experiences.
To be considered a VoT frequently means to be fixed with an ‘unequivocal victim
identity’ (Sanghera 2007). A VoT then is subjected to prescriptive strategies, which,
despite well-meaning intentions of assisting organisations, hinder an affected person
‘to realise his/her life’s full potential’ (Sanghera 2007, iiv).
As a consequence, certain NGOs try to avoid paternalistic strategies in their
treatment of trafficking victims. They frequently employ the term ‘affected by
trafficking’ in order to voice their concern with victimisation and to stress the
person’s capacity to act. The category VoT then refers, if anything, to a temporary
condition or a legal status in a crime case (Goodey 2004). This allows persons
affected by trafficking to speak about violations of their human rights and about
individual suffering. A VoT may claim protection and compensation for physical and
psychological damage. However, instead of being granted rights, frequently the
individual has to cope with gendered protectionist interventions of states (Kapur
2002) that often pursue simple policies of ‘no-prostitution’ or ‘no-migration’ (Popova
2006). In Nepal, for example, women under 30 years of age are not allowed to leave
the country without the permission of their husbands (Kapur 2002).
The IOM further developed a standard procedure to identify persons supposedly
affected by trafficking as VoTs. In order to obtain this status, which entitles them to
take up the organisation’s assistance services, these persons must first undergo a so-
called screening interview arranged by IOM or their partner NGOs. The questionnaire
is based on the definitions given by the UN’s Palermo protocols.3 Thus the IOM asks
about recruitment, transportation, and exploitation, drawing upon the legitimacy of
the international agreement. Leaving aside the problem of ‘internal trafficking’,4
which the IOM considers in its reports as well as in its operational work, many
experts and practitioners argue that the supposedly watertight definitions of the
protocol prove to be problematic on an operational level. In practice a clear
distinction between trafficking5 and smuggling6 is nearly impossible. Many migrants
3 The two Palermo protocols—the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Sea and Air supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, adopted 2000 by the United Nations in Palermo (United Nations 2000).
4 Internal trafficking means that a person has not necessarily to be transported across state
borders in order to be exploited. Internal trafficking occurs within the territory of a state.
Among the VoTs assisted in the TACIS project around 40 per cent lived in the territory of the
Russian Federation (Office of the International Organization for Migration in the Russian
Federation 2008).
5 ‘“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
8who use the services of smugglers later on end up in exploitative circumstances. Then
there are affected persons, escaping trafficking situations by their own means, who do
not consider themselves a VoT and prefer to stay illegally in the country (Pearson
2005).
Standards for exploitation, as Anderson and O’Connell Davidson indicate, strongly
depend on political and moral values. The authors emphasise that in the absence of
globally approved minimum employment rights, it proves impossible to measure
exploitation from a neutral viewpoint. Thus exploitation may be considered at best a
‘continuum of experiences’ with abuses of varying degree (Anderson and O’Connell
Davidson 2003, 8).
The IOM utilises categories based on the definitions of the Palermo protocols in
developing methods to identify migrants in need of protection. This strongly
legitimates identification processes through international law. Likewise, the deficits,
ambiguities and gaps of these definitions, due to which the protocols’ effectiveness as
an instrument protecting human rights of migrants is doubted by many experts, are
transferred.7 However, the general problem is the separation of migrants into the
categories of ‘in need of protection’ and ‘not in need of protection’. This selection
poses a challenge to the universal validity of human rights for migrants. The
identification processes are to be taken seriously into question because the
‘identifiers’ are prone to make incorrect and arbitrary decisions due to imprecise and
ambiguous definitions. Additionally, these procedures possess an inherent logic of
control as a tool of migration management, thereby neglecting the protection of
human rights of, at least, certain groups of migrants.
Rehabilitation
Once an affected person is identified as a VoT and gives his/her voluntary written
consent to be ‘restored’, the person enters a system of control and supervision in order
to ensure his or her rehabilitation and return to ‘normal life’. The rehabilitation starts
with a 21-day long recovery period in a specialised centre run by the IOM, situated in
a private hospital on the outskirts of southwest Moscow. Shortly after arrival, the
victim undergoes a medical screening, where he/she is tested for HIV, hepatitis, and
STIs (Sexually Transmitted Infections). Once a week a victim is provided with a
session of individual therapy and several times a week sessions of group therapy take
place. During the three weeks of treatment victims are not supposed to leave the
hospital alone. Social workers organise leisure activities.
Meanwhile IOM staff prepares the client’s reintegration. The standard reintegration
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs’ (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, art. 3a).
6 “Smuggling of migrants” shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State
Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent Resident’ (Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, art. 3 a).
7 Analyses of the Palermo protocols’ inadequate qualities as an instrument to protect the
human rights of trafficked migrants are numerous, e.g. Gallagher 2001; Jordan 2002; Pearson
2005.
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pays for the repatriation of victims into their home countries/regions. Additionally,
victims are provided with so-called reinstallation grants: 150 euros for Russian
nationals and 50 euros for Non-Russians. The person may also be eligible for
additional grants—in cases of resettlement, housing expenses, basic needs, food and
transportation are covered up to a period of 6 months, and professional training, paid
classes and other income generating activities are supported. Moreover, medical care
and legal counselling are provided in the early stages of rehabilitation. Other IOM
missions or partner-NGOs are contacted in order to monitor the victim’s reintegration
and to avoid re-trafficking. After discharge from the hospital, the victim’s
reintegration will be supervised for up to one year.
This short description illustrates how a person is constructed as a VoT irrespective of
their need for support. A person undergoes a bureaucratic procedure beginning with
the screening interview and ending with the reintegration report. Due to ample
paperwork directed at assigning their status and the subsequent treatment the person
receives, they turn into a VoT, regardless of their former experiences and
subjectivities, or of their future plans. These short descriptions give an idea of how
bureaucratic procedures make the social construction VoT effective. An affected
person is turned through categorisations and standardised treatment into a ‘victim of
trafficking’. The ‘victims’’ experiences, subjectivities and plans for the future are
taken into consideration only to a certain degree. That is to say, interests of migrants
are dealt with only as far as they comply with the spectrum of possibilities offered by
the IOM.
In order to restore VoTs to their former lives, they are admitted temporarily to
premises that Erving Goffman described as a ‘total institution’. The term ‘total
institution’ applies above all to the physical attributes of the hospital building,8 but
also to its inner structure and organisation. In a ‘total institution’ all spheres of life are
concentrated in one place and under one authority, and the freedom of
inmates/patients to make decisions and interact with others is limited (Goffman
1968). To put it in Goffman’s words, the nature of the centre resembles ‘a forcing
house to change persons, as a natural experiment that can be done to the self’
(Goffman 1968, 12). Reading the conditions of rehabilitation according to Goffman
reveals the compulsory character of the IOM-Moscow’s assistance framework that
remains far from conditions of a ‘normal life’9 and reiterates issues and patterns
which have been criticised already in projects the IOM implemented in other
countries (Bernström, Jalakas, and Jeffmar 2006; Limanowska 2007).
An obligatory component of IOM’s support package is the practice of bringing the
persons back to their countries of origin after the treatment. These so-called voluntary
returns explicitly show the tensions laid out in the IOM’s motto ‘Managing migration
for the benefit of all’ (International Organization for Migration 2003). The term
obscures the fact that interests of migrants and nation-states are often diametrically
opposed and always negotiated within the power structures of the state. Although the
IOM pretends to serve the interests of ‘all’, it primarily serves to uphold the asylum
and immigration policies of European states, which ‘would not function without a
strong return policy component’ (Widgren 2002, 2).
8 Controlled entrances/exits, fences, and barred windows that symbolise ‘the barrier to social
intercourse with the outside’ (Goffman 1968, 15).
9 Opposed to the characteristics of a total institution a ‘normal life’ may be characterised by
the separation of working, living, and leisure sphere. In a normal life a person is able to
decide and to act autonomously.
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Two attributes are meant to make the ‘cheaper variant of deportation’ (Berthold
2005) socially acceptable: The term ‘voluntary’ suggests that he/she could choose
between different options whereas virtually there is no choice, because the person
always picks removal (Düvell 2005). Most EU member states bluntly acknowledge
the fact that ‘even voluntary return assistance programmes need some elements of
enforcement or force’ (Widgren 2002, 4) in order to make the concept of ‘voluntary
return’ work and to guarantee its ‘success’. Thus a big percentage of voluntary
returns, which the IOM exercises on behalf of many Western European10 states, may
be accurately referred to as prescribed or mandatory return.11
As one of the most important (reactive) tools of migration management the political
rationality of voluntary return draws on strategic nationalism (Georgi 2007).
According to Jacqueline Berman, the term ‘return’ implies that the person goes back
to where she/he naturally belongs, where she/he gets back the orderly status as citizen
held before (Berman 2003). The gendered and symbolic character of return policies
becomes manifest when sending trafficking victims back ‘home’. After an arranged
return trip women may be confronted by traditional and patriarchal ways of living and
taking up their roles as proper daughters or wives (Berman 2003)—a form of life that
female migrants often try to flee.
Return as a suitable solution and an obligatory component of anti-trafficking policies
is deeply rooted in the IOM’s bureaucratical culture.12 The IOM staff in Moscow
repeatedly affirmed that the only wish of a victim would be to return back home
(Interview with IOM project assistant in Moscow, September 23, 2008). This
suggestion, which exploits the victim’s desire for trust and protection, justifies
policies of migration management as ‘voluntary’ return being the most natural
organising principle. Return policies, on the contrary, often entail stigmatisation once
affected people come back to their ‘home’ countries: returnees will be exposed as
victims of sex-trafficking or at best labelled a failed migrant (Pearson 2002).
Teaching the ‘Model’
As an international organisation, the IOM is associated with being a rational-legal
bureaucracy legitimated through a mandate delegated by its member states, through
its outstanding expertise and through an image of impartiality and neutrality (Barnett
and Finnemore 2004). The EU Commission relies on the IOM to implement its
external migration policies. In its 2001 communication ‘On a Common Policy on
Illegal Immigration’ the Commission highlights the organisation’s competences to
guarantee EU protection standards for migrants and to facilitate cooperation with third
countries (European Commission 2001).
In IOM-led projects such as the EU-financed project in the Russian Federation, the
organisation teaches local governmental organisations and NGOs ‘best practices’.13
10 e.g. Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, United Kingdom, Switzerland (International Organization for Migration 2002).
11 For a taxonomy of return policies see Dünnwald 2008.
12 Vaughan defines bureaucratic culture as: ‘the solutions that are produced by groups of
people to meet specific problems they face in common. These solutions become
institutionalised, remembered, and passed on as the rules, rituals, and values of a group’
(Vaughan 1996, 64).
13 The term ‘best practices’ originates from EU terminology. It is an objective common to all
EU-financed projects to collect, analyse, and refine best or at least good practices. IOM staff
highlights IOM’s strength to impart ‘best practice’—knowledge generated from a multiplicity
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The IOM ‘shows the model’ (Interview with Sergey Trepykhalin, assistant of the
Resident Legal Adviser of the Embassy of the US to Russia in Moscow, 15
September, 2008) in order to develop local actors’ capacity to combat human
trafficking and to orient their actions. They are trained to perform, replicate, and
finally institutionalise practices that take their cues from EU standards and strategies.
Almost all of these cooperation projects are accompanied by conflicts of
communication, cooptation, and coordination. It is extremely worthwhile to study
these disagreements. Equally interesting is an attempt to answer the question of what
is connoted in the term ‘best practice’. If scrutinised from a critical stance,
questioning important categories of migration policies like nation, citizenship, and
illegal migration, such an effort may provide useful insights; not only because the fact
that the dimensions and varieties of human rights for migrants are intrinsically linked
to these categories, but also about the political interests which determine EU anti-
trafficking policies.
The political interests motivating victim protections are evidently reflected by the
term ‘useful victim’. In EU states granting protection to persons affected by
trafficking highly depends on the migrant helpfulness as a witness in lawsuits. Thus
far, in the TACIS-project, ‘usability’ in criminal proceedings is more or less
irrelevant, because shelter and support is not dependent upon giving evidence. Heli
Askola describes what the strict application of the European model means to VoTs
when she criticises the European Council Directive on Victims Protection14: ‘It is thus
not a measure aimed at the protection of trafficking victims, but at squeezing out of
any relevant information that could be used against the “real criminals”, that is, those
who assist and organize irregular migration. After that even the “useful” victims are
discarded’ (Askola 2007, 212).
EU patterns of victim protection are concerned only in a limited way with the
migrants’ welfare. These measures are primarily concerned with effectiveness and
improvement of law enforcement. This calls into question the IOM’s commitment
that all measures to combat trafficking in human beings aim at the wellbeing and
human rights of migrants (United Nations 2008, 7).
Conclusions
The capability to ascribe migrants an identity as a victim rather as a potential victim
or ex post facto is one of IOM’s key instruments to exercise power. Attribution
includes activities on different levels, which are interrelated and are reinforcing each
other:
1) To produce knowledge about at-risk groups and their behavioural patterns
2) To assign affected persons an identity as a VoT and to subject him/her to a
predefined treatment: rehabilitation, return, and eventually reintegration
support
3) To teach societal and state actors a ‘model’ of how to assist victims
of IOM anti-trafficking projects, implemented all over the world (Interview with IOM project
assistant in Moscow, October 2, 2008).
14 The proper name reads: European Council Directive on the residence permit issued to third-
country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the
subjects of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent
authorities, Council Directive 2004/81/EC.
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What does the ascription of a victim-identity mean for migrants then? Notions of
‘potential’ and ‘real’ victims constitute a sine qua non for the IOM’s anti-trafficking
interventions. Affected persons are supposed to accept the status of VoT and behave
accordingly to it. Experiences other than falling victim will be discarded, negotiable
only in the very narrow parameters set for support. A VoT’s refusal of assistance may
be read as pathology (Aradau 2008). Altogether VoTs have to cope with the limited
and restricted facilities provided (Limanowska 2005).
Reading these practices against the background of the IOM’s migration management
approach, which claims to combine reactive and proactive instruments, neither the
Russian project nor completed or ongoing anti-trafficking projects of the IOM in
Central and Eastern Europe focus on proactive strategies to facilitate large-scale
‘legal’ (female) migration. This can be explained through the utilitarian, selective
conception of migration management: to facilitate canalised beneficial migration and
to restrict irregular forms of migration. An alignment of the categories ‘victim’ and
‘irregular migrant’ turns out to be the lynchpin. The construction of victim/irregular
migrant, either as a potential victim, who is driven by push and pull factors, or as
VoT, who is in need for assistance, provides the basis for various types of
(preventive) education measures in order to avoid future or re-trafficking. To consider
potential and actual migrants as people who use their mobility as a resource and as a
vital dimension of their social capital (Morokvasic 2003) would suggest extensive
projects to empower migrants. In the course of the Russian project initiatives such as
the establishment of information centres throughout the Russian Federation, of an
information telephone hotline, and the distribution of comprehensive migration
manuals demonstrate important steps taken in this direction. However, several
pressing questions remain: How can state and IGOs enable migrants to use the given
information in practice? How can they tackle legal exclusion due to irregular
employment? How can the ‘social working of law’15 be integrated (Popova 2007)?
Leaving these questions unanswered suggests that these activities are a matter of
reactive prevention once again.
15 People do not follow legal norms, because these norms do not consider their specific
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